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JUDGES OF CHARACTER
Suzanna Sherry*

I.

INTRODUCTION

For forty years, legal academics have been lost in a wilderness
born of the countermajoritarian difficulty. Despite a two-century
pedigree, we are still arguing about the legitimacy of judicial review
and asking whether it is a curse or a blessing. Many of our most
prominent constitutional scholars are mired in attempts to constrain
judicial review so as to reconcile it with their idealized vision of a
constitutional regime grounded in pure majoritarianism. None has
succeeded.
The few scholars who have attempted to move beyond the
countermajoritarian difficulty face a different problem. As one
scholar has argued, "[i]t takes a theory to beat a theory."1 Without a
theory of constitutional interpretation-whether grounded in
majoritarianism or in some other value-there arises the fear that
judicial review is, as the legal realists supposed, merely the ad hoc
implementation of the judges' own values. Theories of constitutional
interpretation are supposed to constrain judicial discretion and
ensure that the rule of law will prevail over the rules of men.
Unfortunately, no constitutional theory proposed so far is either an
accurate description of how judicial review works in practice or a
useful prescription for constraining judges. The theories provide, at
best, a partial window into the American judicial soul.
The task for post-countermajoritarians, then, is to provide an
attractive normative and descriptive picture of successful judicial
review. For those of us who are legal pragmatists, this means
providing a positive description of how pragmatist judges do or
ought to judge. This Article is meant to be a first step in that
direction. Judicial review as an institution may be a blessing, but
* Cal Turner Professor of Law and Leadership, Vanderbilt University. I
thank Lisa Bressman, Paul Edelman, Daniel Farber, John Goldberg, and the
participants in the Wake Forest Symposium, Judicial Review: Curse or
Blessing? Or Both?, for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Carolyn Seugling
provided excellent research assistance.
1. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalismfor Nonoriginalists,45 Loy. L. REV.
611, 617 (1999).
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particular instances of judicial review can be less salutary. I try
here to identify conditions that make it more or less likely that the
exercise of judicial review will be beneficial. The key, I believe, is a
very old-fashioned notion: judicial character.
II. CHARACTER AND JUDGMENT
Ironically, Alexander Bickel, who in many ways inspired the
late twentieth-century concern about the legitimacy of judicial
review, would likely be at least amused-and perhaps appalled-by
much of the last four decades of constitutional scholarship. Bickel
firmly aligned himself with what he called the "Whig" tradition of
That tradition valued existing institutions,
Edmund Burke.
eschewing radical change in favor of incremental movement toward
unfulfilled aspirations: "We do well to remain attached to
institutions that are often the products more of accident than of
design, or that no longer answer to their original plans, but that
challenge our resilience and inventiveness in bending old
arrangements to present purposes with no outward change." 2
Despite his coinage of the "counter-majoritarian" terminology, then,
his work on judicial review was designed more to preserve the
practice from what were at the time very real political threats than
to deny its legitimacy.'
In addition to their use of Bickel's terminology to support
arguments he might not have agreed with, the majoritarian scholars
who trace their roots to Bickel are missing the most valuable parts
of his philosophy. For Bickel provided more than the nomenclature
and modem reinvigoration of the debate over judicial review, and
more than a Whiggish caution against radical restructuring of
He also, as Anthony Kronman has so
existing institutions.
eloquently argued, provided a philosophy of judging that can, even
2.

ALEXANDER

M.

BICKEL,

REFORM AND

CONTINUITY:

THE

ELECTORAL

3 (1971); see also ALEXANDER
M. BICKEL, Constitutionalism and the Political Process, in THE MORALITY OF
CONSENT 3, 11-25 (1975).
3. For a similar description of Bickel as defending (rather than attacking)
judicial review, see Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The
History of the CountermajoritarianDifficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 159
(2002). For an argument that political threats animated Bickel's philosophy of
prudence, see Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability:
The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine, 80
N.C. L. REV. 1203, 1229-32 (2002). Bickel, of course, was not alone in urging
caution in the face of political threats. Walter Murphy suggested that judges
needed courage-but he meant the courage to pursue the prudent course, "even
when it means risking some political dangers and enduring bitter criticism from
contemporaries as well as from historians for refusing to risk other dangers."
WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 210 (1964).
COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION, AND THE PARTY SYSTEM
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now, help us to move beyond the counter-majoritarian difficulty.
Kronman describes Bickel's "philosophy of prudence" as both "an
intellectual capacity and a temperamental disposition."4 Prudence,
or practical wisdom, in turn depends on what Kronman himself later
labeled "traits of character": those habits of mind and spirit that
allow an individual to make judgments where intellect runs out.5
Life is full of choices, and the life of the law is no exception.
American constitutional jurisprudence in particular seems pervaded
The
by opposing dualities that cannot be fully resolved.
Constitution itself provides for both majority rule and minority
rights, creating the counter-majoritarian dilemma. When judges
must resolve particular cases in the face of this dilemma, judicial
review gives rise to what Bickel identified as the "Lincolnian
tension" between principle and consent.6 In interpreting the
Constitution over time, judges must also navigate between fidelity
to the past and the needs and values of the present, between the
general and the particular, and between the abstract and the
concrete. As if that were not enough, individual clauses of the
Constitution create tensions of their own: between liberty and
equality, between religious exercise and religious establishment,
and between governmental powers and accountability.
Many constitutional scholars-and some judges-try to resolve
these tensions by ignoring, de-emphasizing, or outright rejecting one
half of the dichotomy. Majoritarians allow majority rule to trump
rights,7 moral philosophers privilege rights and principles over
majoritarianism and consent,' originalists neglect the present in
favor of the past.9 And critical legal scholars, recognizing these
inherent tensions (as well as others) as part of a "fundamental
4. Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94
YALE L.J. 1567, 1569 (1985).
5. Anthony Kronman, Practical Wisdom and Professional Character, in
PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 203, 208 (Jules Coleman & Ellen Frankel Paul eds., 1987)
[hereinafter Kronman, PracticalWisdom]; see also ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE
LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 53-108 (1993). Another
nice description of character-and why it is important for judges-may be found
in Mark Tushnet, ConstitutionalInterpretation, Character,and Experience, 72
B.U. L. REV. 747, 762-63 (1992).
6.

ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
BAR OF POLITICS 65-72 (1962).

COURT AT THE

7. Examples include Akhil Amar and Bruce Ackerman. For further
discussion, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 75-121
(2002).
8. The most prominent scholars of this type are Ronald Dworkin and
Richard Epstein. For elaboration, see id. at 55-74, 122-39.
9. Frank Easterbrook, Robert Bork, and Antonin Scalia are among those
who often favor originalist approaches. For further discussion, see id. at 10-54.
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contradiction," see them as a fatal flaw and therefore as a reason to
abandon objectivity and the rule of law in favor of pure political
adjudication.' °
Even the post-majoritarians who focus on judicial techniques,
as, for example, Cass Sunstein does, get caught in the problem of
dualities. Sunstein is right to notice that judicial minimalism can
foster both democracy and the beneficial use of judicial review (thus
moving beyond the counter-majoritarian dilemma). But, as he also
notes, "the minimalist path usually'-not always, but usuallymakes a good deal of sense" in certain circumstances. 1
"Maximalist" invalidations, he argues, should be avoided "unless
there is a good argument for invalidation on democratic grounds, or
unless the Court has considerable confidence in its judgment."'" The
rub lies in his justifiable refusal to adopt an absolutist stance. If
minimalism is only a presumption, how are judges to know when to
depart from it? Sometimes what Sunstein calls a wide and deep, or
maximalist, decision is warranted, as with Brown v. Board of
Education 3 or Loving v. Virginia.14

And one conspicuously

minimalist opinion, written a year after Sunstein's book was
published, has drawn fire from none other than Sunstein himself.
Discussing Bush v. Gore," notorious for both its narrowness 6 and its
shallowness," Sunstein noted that "the majority's opinion has some
of the most severe vices of judicial minimalism."'8
I do not mean to single out Sunstein. Indeed, he is one of a few
prominent constitutional scholars who have left the narrow path
marked out by the debate over the counter-majoritarian dilemma,
and sought instead to specify guidelines for the exercise of judicial
review.' 9 But his thoughtful-and to a large extent useful10. For a critique of the post-modern abandonment of objectivity and the
rule of law, see

DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON:

THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW

(1997).

11.

CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 5 (1999) (emphasis added).

12. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. 388 U.S..1 (1967).
15. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
16. In noting that "[o]ur consideration is limited to the present
circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes
generally presents many complexities," id. at 109, the Court made clear that the
equal protection arguments were a ticket for one train only.
17. As many other scholars have noted, the equal protection reasoning does
not support the remedy, and the remedy-supportive reasoning of the
concurrence did not command a majority. See the articles cited infra note 46.
18. Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 767
(2001).
19. For a critique of other prominent scholars as overly constrained by the
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guidelines nevertheless founder on the same shoals that any
constitutional theory does: if it is to be practical, it has to have
nuances and exceptions, and if it has nuances and exceptions, then
it cannot satisfactorily account for every possible case. In other
words, the devil is in the details--specifically, in the practice:
knowing when the theory applies and when it does not. And that is
where judges, judgment, and judicial character come in.
Purportedly simple techniques and intricate theories of
interpretation may dazzle temporarily, but ultimately they cannot
disguise the need to make choices among conflicting and often
incommensurate values. Intellectual ability and abstract reason
may help us identify the values and the conflicts, and give us some
insight into the consequences of our choices, but cannot alone lead
us to sound results. Only good judgment can mediate between
constitutional dualities. As Walter Murphy pointed out long ago,
"[n]o method can reduce the art of judgment, whether legal,
political, or ethical, to an IBM punch-card system."2° Whether one
calls it prudence, practical wisdom, practical reason,21 pragmatism, 2
or situation-sense, 2 in the end it comes down to an exercise of
judgment. That, after all, is why we call them judges.
But judges, like all of us, can judge poorly or well. Here is
where Bickel's "temperamental disposition" and Kronman's "traits
of character" can help. Judges-like any person officially entrusted
with making decisions that affect others--should exhibit certain
character traits, such as honesty, impartiality, and integrity.21 The
wise exercise of the power of judicial review, however, requires
more. It is my purpose in this Article to sketch briefly two of the
most important of these additional character traits: humility and
counter-majoritarian dilemma, see FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 1-6.
Ironically, Murphy's insight has
20. MURPHY, supra note 3, at 208.
outlasted computer punch-cards.
21. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 77-80
(1990); Steven J. Burton, Law As PracticalReason, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 74750 (1989).
22. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatismfor
the Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 163-65 (1995).
23. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 121 (1960).
24. For descriptions of judicial character as including these types of traits,
see, for example, STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 163-65 (1992);
Kronman, PracticalWisdom, supra note 5, at 220-21; Lawrence B. Solum, The
Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to JudicialSelection, 61 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1751-52 (1988). For a description of "integrity" similar to
Kronman's "practical wisdom," see Catharine Pierce Wells, Pragmatism,
Honesty, and Integrity, in INTEGRITY AND CONSCIENCE 270, 291-93 (Ian Shapiro
& Robert Adams eds., 1998).
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courage.
Note that in discussing the necessary character traits of good
judges, I am indifferent to personal character: it is judicial
temperament that matters. 25 Because I am focusing on judicial
character, moreover, "courage" takes on a more limited meaning
than it might in other contexts. Judges rarely face the sort of
physical threat that most often separates the courageous from the
cowardly. 26 Nevertheless, courage-in the sense of confronting one's
fears and acting despite them-has a role to play in judging. A good
judge, because she is humble about her own role and abilities, is
especially likely to fear being wrong. In the face of such a fear, it is
easier not to act than to act: sins of omission never seem as
frightening when the alternative is to take a bold step that might be
mistaken.
Thus, judicial courage entails acting despite the
uncertainty, born of humility, about the correctness of one's
actions.2 7
Finally, a caveat: I do not mean to suggest that humility and
courage are the only character traits relevant to good judging, nor
that character alone defines the good judge. Judges also need
empathy, imagination, candor, and self-awareness, among other
traits. Moreover, it is certainly possible to imagine a judge who is
simultaneously humble and courageous.., and utterly, undeniably
wrong on the merits. Good character is but one of many restraints
on judicial error.' Nor will a focus on character save us from the
necessity of making-and evaluating-hard decisions about value
choices. Character is not a substitute for judgment, but merely
facilitates it.
25. While it may be more usual for personal and judicial character to align,
it is not necessary. Holmes and Frankfurter, for example, both of whom are
known for their humility about the judicial role, were hardly humble personally.
Cardozo, on the other hand, might be seen as a courageous judge but a rather
timid individual.
26. For a fuller description of this general sort of courage, see WILLIAM IAN
MILLER, THE MYSTERY OF COURAGE (2000).

27. I mean to distinguish this fear of error from a different type of fear that
some have recently attributed to federal judges, especially Supreme Court
Justices: fear of public opinion. Lawrence Solum calls this "civic cowardice."
See Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centred Theory of
Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178, 183 (2003). I have also recently heard some
conservatives attribute the Supreme Court's failure to fully adopt their platform
to a fear of offending the Washington elites.
28. For an elaboration of some of these traits-and how Justice Cardozo, in
particular, exhibited them-see John C.P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1456-61 (1999).
29. In future work, I plan to examine some of the other restraints,
including legal training, judging as craft, precedent, the necessity of persuading
other judges, and the requirement of writing an opinion to support a holding.
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HUMILITY AND ARROGANCE

The proposition that judges should be humble rather than
arrogant hardly needs stating. The need for judicial humility was
most famously recognized by Learned Hand, who described "the
spirit of liberty" as "the spirit which is not too sure that it is right."30
Felix Frankfurter similarly urged on judges "humility and an
understanding of. . .their own inadequacy in dealing with" the
broad range of problems they confront.31 Stephen Breyer has
recently reiterated Hand's caution, suggesting that judges should
"consider the constitutionality of statutes with a certain modesty."3 2
Scholars have also frequently called for judicial humility.3 One
scholar has specifically linked humility with the exercise of
Kronman's practical wisdom, arguing that humility helps to
"synthesize or mediate.., competing claims" similar to the dualities
I described earlier . '
My contribution to this tradition is a pragmatic one: I want to
illustrate the need for judicial humility by showing how its absence
produces bad constitutional decisions. I focus on two Supreme Court
decisions, a century-and-a-half apart, that exhibit a particularly
seductive type of judicial arrogance.
Arrogance, of course, comes in many forms. The most common
judicial variant is, as Hand, Frankfurter, and Breyer recognized, a
misleading certitude in the correctness of one's own decisions. This
type of arrogance is perhaps an occupational hazard for judges
whose decisions, even when they are not infallible, are often final .
It may be exacerbated by the recent tendency to accept judicial
supremacy unquestioningly.36 Several aspects of our judicial system
moderate its pernicious effect, however. First, it is such a wellknown danger that conscientious judges-like those quoted earlierwork hard to combat it in themselves. Second, the hierarchical
30.

LEARNED HAND,

The Spirit of Liberty, in

THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS

189, 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960).
31. Felix Frankfurter, Chief JusticesI Have Known, 39 VA. L. REV.883, 905

AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND

(1953); see also Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311,
312-13 (1955) (praising Justice Roberts for his "humility engendered by
consciousness of limitations").
32. Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245,
250 (2002).
33. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I See It," 105 YALE L.J.
1023, 1034-35 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint,65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1365, 1372 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements,
108 HARv. L. REV. 1733, 1749 (1995).
34. Brett Scharffs, The Role of Humility in Exercising PracticalWisdom, 32
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 127, 157 (1998).
35. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We
are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
final.").
36. See Tushnet, supra note 3, at 1230.
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nature of the federal courts means that all federal judges (with only
nine exceptions) face the possibility of reversal by a higher court,
tempering their temptation to consider themselves infallible. The
common law method, which encourages a simultaneously respectful
but open-minded attitude toward precedent, tends to rein in the
most radically arrogant. 37 Finally, the existence of multi-member
courts appointed over time reduces the tendency toward arrogance
by producing differences of opinion: It is more difficult to maintain
absolute faith in one's own beliefs in the face of equal but opposite
certitude by one's respected colleagues. Self-aggrandizing arrogance
is, therefore, not as dangerous in practice as it might appear in
theory.
A more dangerous manifestation of judicial arrogance, however,
stems not from too much self-esteem, but from a kind of selfless
devotion to the public good. The most troubling lack of humility
comes from the judge who takes it upon himself to save a nation in
crisis. Two of the greatest misuses of the power of judicial review
stem, at least in part, from this sort of arrogance: Dred Scott v.
Sandford38 and Bush v. Gore.3 9 While history has yet to judge the
latter case as it has the former, the cases have much in common.
Arguably driven by a desire to avert a constitutional crisis, a divided
Court in each case produced a result that was both controversial and
inadequately supported by precedent or reasoming. 4°
It is almost an article of faith in American jurisprudence that
the decision in Dred Scott was flawed as well as disastrous,
The analytical
exemplifying "judicial review at its worst."4 1
37. It is therefore no surprise that judges who express radical views in their
scholarship often do not implement those views in their judicial decisions. See
FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 7, at 29-54 (discussing Scalia); Daniel A. Farber,
Do Theories of Statutory InterpretationMatter?A Case Study, 94 Nw. U. L. REV.
1409, 1410-11 (2000); Tushnet, supra note 5, at 752.
38. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
39. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
40. For some other comparisons between the two cases, see Stephen
Holmes, Afterword: Can A Coin-Toss Election Trigger a Constitutional
Earthquake?, in THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 2000, at 235, 235-50 (Jack N.
Rakove ed., 2001); Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of
Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721 (2001); Neal Kumar Katyal,
Politics Over Principle, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2000, at A35, available at 2000
WL 29921407. One difference between the two cases is the magnitude of the
"constitutional crisis": As Keith Whittington has aptly noted, the election of
2000 simply does not qualify as a constitutional crisis. Keith E. Whittington,
Yet Another ConstitutionalCrisis?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2093, 2093 (2002).
41. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & SAMUEL KRISLOV, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 34 (2d
ed. 1990); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS 41 (1970) (a "ghastly error"); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 28 (1990) ("the worst
constitutional decision of the nineteenth century"); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
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weakness of the majority and concurring opinions in Bush v. Gore is
more contested, but even the decision's supporters tend to be
lukewarm in their endorsements. Michael McConnell gives it "two42
and-a-half cheers," and criticizes the Court's halting of the recount.
Richard Epstein roundly criticizes both the rationale and the
remedy of the majority opinion, finding only the reasoning of the
three-Justice concurrence sound.' Richard Posner calls the result
"rough justice," and can only conclude that "it may have been legal
justice as well."
Posner and John Yoo defend the decision
primarily for its success in averting a constitutional crisis. 41 Most
academic commentary has been highly critical.46 Almost no one
defends the reasoning of the two lead opinions. It is thus fair to
characterize Bush v. Gore as not one of judicial review's most
CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS

1789-1888, at

264 (1985) ("bad policy," "bad judicial politics," and "bad law");
JACOBSOHN, THE

ASPIRATION

SUPREME

COURT AND

THE

DECLINE

OF

GARY

J.

CONSTITUTIONAL

44 (1986) ("the most odious action ever taken by a branch of the

federal government");

ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT

94 (1960) ("the most disastrous opinion the Supreme Court has ever issued");
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism'sForgotten Past, 10 CONST.
COMMENT.37,

41 (1993) ("the worst atrocity in the Supreme Court's history").
42. Michael W. McConnell, Two-and-a-HalfCheers for Bush v. Gore, 68 U.
CHI. L. REV. 657, 659-60 (2001).
43. Richard A. Epstein, "In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May
Direct": The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 614
(2001).
44. Richard A. Posner, Florida2000: A Legal and StatisticalAnalysis of the
Election Deadlock and the Ensuing Litigation, 2000 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 60 (2001)
(emphasis added).

45.

RICHARD

A.

POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE

2000

ELECTION, THE

4 (2001); John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's
Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 776 (2001).
46. For a sampling of the voluminous criticism, see, for example, ALAN M.
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS

DERSHOWITZ,

2000 (2001);

SUPREME INJUSTICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED: HOW THE COURT

2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2001); Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v.
Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093 (2001); Elizabeth
Garrett, Institutional Lessons from the 2000 PresidentialElection, 29 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 975 (2001); Holmes, supra note 40; Samuel Issacharoff, Political
Judgments, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 637 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan, Equal Protection:
Bush v. Gore and the Making of a Precedent, in THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF
2000, supra note 40, at 159, 159-96; Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court in
Politics, in THE UNFINISHED ELECTION OF 2000, supra note 40, at 105, 105-52;
Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 679
(2001); Peter M. Shane, Disappearing Democracy: How Bush v. Gore
Undermined the Federal Right to Vote for PresidentialElectors, 29 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 535 (2001); David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737 (2001); Sunstein, supra note 18; Vikram Amar & Alan
Brownstein, Bush v. Gore and Article II: Pressured Judgment Makes Dubious
Law, FED. LAW., Mar./Apr. 2001, at 27.
DECIDED THE
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shining moments.
For purposes of this Article, however, the weakness of the
opinions in Dred Scott and Bush v. Gore is less important than the
motivation behind the decisions. In both cases, the Court acted-at
least in part--out of a genuine sense of responsibility for the fate of
the nation. As Robert McCloskey described the context of Dred
Scott: "The nation was in deadly jeopardy. It would be tragic for the
Court to withhold its hand, if that hand might save the Union."47
Don Fehrenbacher, the pre-eminent Dred Scott scholar, talks about
"the Court's own sense of strategic responsibility in the American
constitutional system" and describes the case as "[Chief Justice]
'
Taney's attempt to end the slavery controversy by judicial fiat.
The motives for the Supreme Court's intervention in the 2000
presidential election are murkier, but the most plausible
explanation attributes to the Justices in the majority the same sense
of obligation toward the nation's constitutional well-being. Justice
O'Connor's maiority opinion speaks of the Court's "unsought
responsibility."
Justice Breyer, in dissent, attributes to his
brethren an intent "to bring this agonizingly long election process to
a definitive conclusion."'
Defenders of the decision describe the
Court's motivation similarly. Yoo argues that "the Supreme Court
believed that it could finally bring an end to the destructive partisan
struggle over the presidential election."'" Posner suggests that
"without the Court's intervention the deadlock would have
mushroomed into a genuine crisis,"5'2 and defends the Court's
willingness to act even at the risk of endangering its own legitimacy:
"Judges unwilling to sacrifice some of their prestige for the greater
good of the nation might be thought selfish."'
This sort of institutional arrogance does not necessarily depend
on certitude. Sometimes it springs instead from a belief that,
regardless of the "right" answer, the judiciary is the only branch
that can supply a practical solution. The Dred Scott Court triedunsuccessfully-to prevent the nation from being torn apart by the
political stalemate on slavery. The Bush v.Gore Court turned out to
be more successful (although no less arrogant) in its belief that an
47.

MCCLOSKEY, supra note

48.

DON

E.

FEHRENBACHER,

41, at 93.
THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN

209, 573 (1978).
49. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000).
50. Id. at 158 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
51. Yoo, supra note 45, at 789. For similar sentiments, see, for example,
RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 91-97 (2001); Charles Fried &
Ronald Dworkin, Editorial, "A Badly Flawed Election": An Exchange, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Feb. 22, 2001, at 8, 8.
52. POSNER, supra note 45, at 161.
53. Id. at 162. Similar sentiments by other commentators are described in
Jesse H. Choper, Why The Supreme Court Should Not Have Decided the
PresidentialElection of 2000, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 335, 353-55 (2001).
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
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immediate judicial solution was more conducive to constitutional
stability than a drawn-out political battle, even if both would have
ended in the election of George W. Bush. Note that the lack of
humility that characterizes this type of institutional arrogance rests
more on a belief in judicial omnipotence than on any notion of
judicial supremacy, although a judicial solution is unlikely to
succeed in the absence of popular acceptance of judicial supremacy.
Institutional arrogance is both more alluring and more difficult
to guard against than the garden-variety delusion of infallibility. As
Posner's comment demonstrates, this type of arrogance
masquerades as selflessness or heroism, verging on martyrdom.
The Court is asking not what judges can do for themselves, but what
they can do for their country. This seems, superficially, to be a
beneficial character trait, not a dangerous one; judges-and the
public-are less likely to be vigilant in cabining it. And, of course,
there is a disarming kernel of truth in the attitude of institutional
arrogance: In cases from McCulloch ' to Brown5 1 to the Nixon16 tapes
case, the Supreme Court's intervention was necessary to combat the
paralysis of, or resolve a conflict between, the political branches. 7
The civil rights movement would have been severely handicappedif not stillborn-but for the courageous acts of lower court judges.58
This last insight-that institutional judicial arrogance has its
advantages-leads to a second, and perhaps more important, point.
While judges must guard against arrogance, they should also be
wary of the opposite flaw: timidity.
IV.

COURAGE AND TIMIDITY

While many have urged judicial humility, fewer have focused on
judicial courage. Bickel himself emphasized the caution that comes
with prudence more than the action that comes with courage. 9 This
has led some modern scholars to reject Bickel as intolerably
conservative.' Whether or not this is an accurate reading of Bickel,
54. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
55. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
56. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
57. The certainty of a national crisis and the inability of other actors to
avert it are two factors that Ward Farnsworth identifies as relevant to the
question whether the Court should, on the basis of pragmatic considerations,
act "lawlessly" (that is, beyond its jurisdiction). Ward Farnsworth, "To Do a
Great Right, Do a Little Wrong": A User's Guide to Judicial Lawlessness, 86
MINN. L. REV. 227, 229, 245-48 (2001). He concludes that Bush v. Gore fails this
pragmatist test. Id. at 229.
58. See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981).
59. See BICKEL, supra note 6.
60. Gerald Gunther was the first scholar-and perhaps the most
sophisticated-but not the last, to criticize Bickel on these grounds. See Gerald
Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle
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it is wrongheaded insofar as it demands a choice between humility
and courage rather than an attempt to accommodate both.
A few pragmatist scholars have recognized the need for
accommodation: Kronman argues that a prudent judge needs what

he calls "deliberative imagination., 61 Richard Posner describes good

judgment as "some ineffable compound of caution, detachment, and
imagination." 62 Although each of these scholars means something
slightly different, both recognize that a necessary part of good
judgment (or practical wisdom) is an ability to know when it is more
appropriate to act than to abstain from acting.
A few scholars and judges have similarly recognized that too
much humility can prevent judges from acting when they ought to.
Describing Hand's humility, for example, Ronald Dworkin says that
it stemmed from "a disabling uncertainty that he--or anyone elsecould discover which convictions were true."6 Steven Burton, in
defending and defining law as practical reason, eloquently notes
that "[t]he life of the law has not been lo,1c or experience: it has
been imagination and courage in action."
Judge John Noonan
praises Marshall, Brandeis, Holmes, and Cardozo for their
"fortitude," quoting Brandeis on "the virtues... of truth, of courage,
of willingness to risk positions, of the willingness to risk criticisms,
of the willingness to risk the misunderstandings that so often come
when people do the heroic thing."6 At least three Justices on the
current Supreme Court similarly recognize the potentially disabling
effects of self-doubt: "Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of
doubt."'
In general, however, the vices of humility are less well-known
than its virtues. And the character trait that counters the vices of
too much humility and inclines one toward acting-even in the face
of self-doubt-is courage; its opposite is timidity.
The widespread recognition of the need for humility makes it
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964). For a more
elaborate argument about Bickel's lack of followers, see Kronman, supra note 4,
at 1571-73.
61. KRONMAN, supra note 5, at 325-28.
62. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudenceof Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV.
827,854 (1988).
63. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 342 (1996) (emphasis added). Dworkin himself suffers
from no such uncertainty. And Hand, despite his purported disability, could be
courageous on occasion. See Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917).
64. Burton, supra note 21, at 792.
65. The Honorable John T. Noonan, Jr., Education, Intelligence, and
Characterin Judges, 71 MINN. L.REV. 1119, 1130-32 (1987) (quoting ALPHEUS
THOMAS MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE 281 (1956)).
66. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844
(1992).
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especially important to stress the need for judicial courage. The
problem is that one common response to humility and doubt is to
privilege humility: to urge a system of pure self-restraint rather
than attempt to live with both humility and courage. The modern
turn toward grand theory in constitutional law typifies this reaction.
The scholars (and a few judges) who urge courts to tether
themselves to a single method of interpretation-whether
originalism, textualism, intra-textualism,
or constitutional
dualism-are, in effect, privileging humility over courage.67 Afraid
that judges might make mistakes, they seek refuge in a constraining
methodology designed to produce right answers without the exercise
of judgment. As I have argued elsewhere, this mechanical certitude
is an impossible goal: no theory applies itself, and there is always
room for judgment and discretion.
But responding to humility with timidity is not only selfdefeating, it is also pernicious. Some of the most successful
instances of judicial review have been acts of courage, and a
cowardly failure to act can be as damaging as arrogance. I have
already mentioned briefly a few of the cases in which courageous
judges stepped into the breach and accomplished much good;
readers can undoubtedly provide additional examples. Here I want
to focus instead on the dangers of timidity. I hope that in doing so, I
will both demonstrate the need for judicial courage and show how it
balances humility.
Three very different examples may serve to illustrate the harms
that can arise when judges are too diffident. First, judges who are
overly awed by the political branches, and overly humble about their
own role, may allow shameful events to occur or continue. In 1937,
after a momentous struggle over the role of the judiciary in our
constitutional democracy, a Court acutely aware of its own
shortcomings vowed eternal humility. That vow produced many
good decisions, but it also produced two reminiscent of Dred Scott: in
the early 1940s, the Supreme Court decided Hirabayashiv. United
States69 and Korematsu v. United States, ° approving racially-based
curfews and relocation orders. Korematsu has been called "a case
that has come to live in infamy,"71 and "one of the Court's most
67. For descriptions, scholarly adherents, and critiques of some of these
methods of interpetation, see FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 10. For a more
generalized example of a scholar whose vision of judging accommodates

humility but not courage, see

MARY ANN GLENDON,

A

NATION UNDER LAWYERS:

How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY
169-70 (1994).
68. FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 10, at 3-14.
69. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
70. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
71. KATHLEEN SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 631 n.4
(14th ed. 2001).
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embarrassing moments."72 The two cases are also an example of a
Court with an overly humble attitude towards its own role:
Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of
judgment and discretion and for the choice of means by those
branches of the Government on which the Constitution has
placed the responsibility of war-making, it is not for any court
to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its
judgment for theirs.73

The dissenting opinions in Korematsu, which history has
vindicated, achieved a better balance between humility and courage.
Justice Murphy, after noting that judgments of military necessity
"ought not to be overruled lightly by those whose training and duties
ill-equip them to deal intelligently with matters so vital to the
physical security of the nation,"74 nevertheless found the relocation
order unconstitutional.
Justice Jackson-who ten years later
would describe so humbly the Court's fallibility--struck a similar
balance, voting to invalidate the relocation order despite his
recognition that "[i]n the very nature of things military decisions are
not susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal."76 Jackson also
recognized the peculiar dangers of a court unwilling to stand up for
principle: "[A] judicial construction of the due process clause that
will sustain this order is a far more
subtle blow to liberty than the
77
promulgation of the order itself."
Korematsu thus illustrates that judicial humility is not always a
good thing. Note that in this it differs from another infamous
7s
discrimination case, Plessy v. Ferguson.
In Plessy, the Court failed

to invalidate racially discriminatory laws in large part because the
Justices shared the underlying belief in the appropriateness of
racial segregation.79 In Korematsu, while judicial racism may have
played some minor part in the decision, the Court's humble
deference to the military and the political branches was much more
apparent.' Only the dissenters were courageous enough to risk
72. David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy:
First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV.

C.R.-C.L. L.

REV.

319, 343 (1994).

73.

Hirabayashi,320 U.S. at 93.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 233-35.
Id. at 245 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 245-46.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).

79.

See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 Sup. CT. REV. 303,

319-20 (1998).
80. Historian (and lawyer) Peter Irons concludes that the military orders
culminating in internment "resulted from racism, war hysteria, and the failure
of leadership at the highest levels of government," but that the legal cases
simply "reflected the failure of the legal system." PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR
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being mistaken. (That the risk seems small in hindsight does not
diminish their courage.)
The case of Poe v. Ullman8 ' provides a different sort of
illustration of the dangers of responding to humility with timidity.
Poe, decided four years before Griswold v. Connecticut, 2 refused to
reach the merits of a challenge to the constitutionality of
Connecticut's ban on the sale or use of contraceptives.8
In Poe, the majority drew on a long tradition of justiciability,
described by Justice Frankfurter as flowing from the "restricted"
role of the federal courts." These rules operated to cabin the judicial
tendency toward arrogance. But in this case, the caution was
misplaced. Justice Harlan's eloquent dissent tore to shreds the
majority's reasoning, and demonstrated its misuse of precedent.
And Harlan offers another example of courage in the face of doubt.
Like Jackson before him, Harlan recognized that the Court should
"exercise limited and sharply restrained judgment," and should
"hesitate long before concluding that the Constitution precluded
Connecticut from choosing as it has among [the] various views" on
the morality of contraceptives.8 5 Nevertheless, Harlan thought the
Court was required not only to confront the merits of the case but to
invalidate the Connecticut statute on constitutional grounds.8
History has vindicated Harlan as well. Not only did the Supreme
Court ultimately invalidate the Connecticut statute in Griswold, but
Griswold itself-when separated from its extension in Roe v.
Wade 87-has become so enshrined in the American pantheon of
rightly-decided cases that Robert Bork's nomination foundered in
large part on his rejection of it.8'
Poe differs from Korematsu in two respects. It is not as bad,
symbolically, as Korematsu-pace Gunther-because in Poe the
365 (1983). His discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of the cases does
not indicate that racial prejudice played much role in the decisions. See id. at
227-50, 319-45. And his overarching conclusion is that political actors and
government lawyers lied to the courts, eliminating any hope that they might
reach correct results. See, e.g., id. at viii ("Never before has evidence emerged
that shows a deliberate campaign to present tainted records to the Supreme
Court.").
81. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
82. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
83. Poe, 367 U.S. at 507-09.
84. Id. at 503.
85. Id. at 544, 547 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 553-54.
87. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
88. Michael Klarman includes Griswold in his list of cases in which the
Supreme Court's decision reflected national majority views and suppressed
"outlier state practices." Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the History of
American Freedom (Review Essay of Eric Foner,The Story of American Freedom
(1998)), 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 265, 279 (2000).
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Court refused to act at all rather than giving its imprimatur to
unconstitutional government action. 89 But the Court's timidity in
Poe is worse than Korematsu in another respect. In Korematsu, the
lapse of time and the change of the fortunes of war meant that the
relocation and internment programs were ending even as the Court
validated them; aside from its symbolic or expressive effect, then,
the decision in Korematsu affected relatively few people. Korematsu
did not, ultimately, perpetuate an ongoing constitutional violation.
But during the four year gap between the Court's abdication in Poe
and its decision in Griswold, birth control remained unavailable to
poor women in Connecticut and other states.9° We have no way of
knowing how many women died-of childbirth, of suicide born of
desperation, or of illegal abortions--or how many unwanted children
were born during those four years. Those deaths and births are all
the more painful because the Supreme Court ultimately found the
statute unconstitutional. That Korematsu has never been formally
reversed-or completely repudiated-by the Supreme Court may be
a blot on our history, but it means that the Court's timidity was not
merely the postponement of the inevitable. (Indeed, I would not be
at all surprised if Korematsu ends up being cited with approval by
the Supreme Court some time during the current war on terrorism.)
Poe, by contrast, was a futile effort to stave off the need to act
courageously. 91
My third example involves an ongoing Supreme Court effort to
postpone deciding a difficult constitutional question. The first
constitutional challenge to affirmative action in educational
institutions reached the Supreme Court in 1973.92 The Court
ducked the issue then, and for the last thirty years has refused to
89. The interplay between Bickel and Gunther on this case provides an
interesting sidelight. Gunther reads Bickel's "passive virtues" as counseling
inaction in cases such as Poe, and then criticizes Bickel for not supporting the
Court's clever use of those same virtues. Gunther, supra note 60, at 18.
Perhaps, however, Gunther-like many of Bickel's readers-has overestimated
Bickel's emphasis on judicial caution, wrongly concluding that Bickel finds no
room for judicial courage.
90. The effect is made worse if one considers that the Supreme Court first
refused to confront the merits of the Connecticut birth control statute almost
twenty years before Poe. In Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943), the
Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the law on standing grounds.
91. One could make the same argument about Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985
(1956), dismissing an appeal that challenged Virginia's anti-miscegenation
laws, which the Court struck down eleven years later in Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967). Bickel, of course, famously defended Naim, as he did the result
in Poe. See BICKEL, supra note 6, at 174.
92. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 348 (1974) (finding the challenge
moot, on somewhat weak reasoning exposed by the dissent).
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provide a definitive answer to a question that continues to divide
Americans.93 The Court's only discussion on the merits, in Regents
of the University of Californiav. Bakke,9 produced such a quagmire
that lower courts cannot even agree on what the case stands for.95
The Court has since steadfastly denied certiorari in all cases raising
questions about educational affirmative action.' Regardless of one's
views on the merits, the current uncertainty increases friction and
resentment on both sides and encourages litigation. The situation
also discourages both sides from focusing on additional or
alternative remedies for the poor performance of African-Americans
on the standardized tests used in college admissions. A definitive
ruling on the constitutionality of affirmative action (and, if
constitutional, its legal contours) would allow us to move on.
The history of anti-abortion laws provides an illuminating
contrast to affirmative action. With the change in personnel in the
1980s came a change in the Court's ideological outlook. The reach of
Roe v. Wade was incrementally narrowed, leading opponents to
believe that it might soon be overruled. During this period, then,
the constitutional status of anti-abortion laws was uncertain,
similar to the state of affirmative action today. In response, state
legislatures enacted a steady stream of restrictions on abortion,
moving increasingly closer to outright bans-and resulting in almost
constant litigation. For a time the Court wavered, upholding many
93. One of my colleagues has recently argued that affirmative action is
increasing racial tension, and specifically that it is a "wedge" issue that allows
white supremacist groups to attract young, moderate whites who would not
otherwise join such organizations.
CAROL M. SWAIN, THE NEW WHITE
NATIONALISM IN AMERICA: ITS CHALLENGE TO INTEGRATION 336-37 (2002).
94. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
95. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Grutter v. Bollinger,
288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 617 (2002).
96. See, e.g., Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1191 (9th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1051 (2001); Eisenberg v. Montgomery County
Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123, 133 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1019 (2000);
Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 700-01 (4th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1050 (2000); Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 190 F.3d
1061, 1067 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 877 (2000); Hopwood v. Texas,
78 F.3d 932, 934 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). As this
Article goes to press, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a pair of
cases challenging affirmative action at the University of Michigan. See Grutter,
288 F.3d 732; Gratz v. Bollinger, 135 F. Supp. 2d 790 (E.D. Mich. 2001), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 617 (2002). It is always risky to predict Supreme Court
decisions, but I do not believe that the Court's decision will offer much
guidance. The Court is unlikely to produce a majority opinion, and at least one
of the Justices in the majority will end up concurring on narrow and unhelpful
grounds. In short, the case is likely to produce more, rather than less,
litigation.
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of the restrictions without overruling Roe. But the courageous
decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey" made clear that the core of Roe-although not its broadest
implications-was still good law, and put an end to legislative
flirtation with unconstitutionality. Subsequent state restrictions on
abortion were much narrower, and the enactment of new antiabortion laws slowed to a trickle. Both sides have since moved on.
Proponents of choice have turned to state courts and state
constitutions for protection where Casey left off, and opponents have
turned to methods other than legislation to discourage abortion.
Had the Court in Casey instead overruled Roe, that course, too,
would have provided a clear answer and allowed both sides to focus
on more effective strategies than constant litigation.
The affirmative action and abortion situations illustrate an
important point about judicial courage. In both cases, my critique
focuses not on the result but on the mere need for a clear decision.
What if the Court had reached (or did or would reach) the wrong
result? It is exactly that possibility that makes the Court's action in
Casey courageous and the Court's inaction in the affirmative action
context overly timid. Judicial courage entails acting in the face of
justifiable humility, and risking the very real possibility of making a
mistake.
V.

CONCLUSION

Readers may complain that rather than describing how
pragmatist judging might be accomplished, I have focused only on
who might make a good pragmatist judge. That is because, in one
sense, pragmatist judging is like good writing: you cannot teach
someone to do it by laying down rules, or even guidelines. Indeed,
rules tend to diminish rather than improve the quality of writing.
(Look at any example of good writing and see how many times it
violates the "rules" you were taught in school.)
Experience,
particularly under the careful tutelage of a good writer, is the best
teacher. And so it is with pragmatism: at best, we can provide
exemplars, we can rely on experience to guide judges, and we can
look for character traits-akin to an inborn ear for language in good
writers-that lend themselves to good judgment.
In the end, humility and courage are like other constitutional
dualities: there is no mechanical device that can mediate between
them. But judges who are inclined both to doubt themselves and to
risk being wrong are more likely to reach a happy medium than are
judges who are too strongly inclined toward arrogance or timidity. I
can point to no better example of the happy amalgam of courage and
97.

505 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1992).
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humility than Justice Jackson's concurrence in McGrath v.
Kristensen9 Having concluded in 1940, when he was Attorney
General, that the Selective Service Act allowed the United States to
draft visiting foreigners who, for reasons beyond their control, were
temporarily unable to return home, Jackson faced exactly the same
question in 1950 as a Justice. Joining the Court's opinion holding
that the Act did not apply to such foreign nationals, he concurred to
explain the inconsistency:
Baron Bramwell extricated himself from a somewhat similar
embarrassment by saying, "The matter does not appear to me
now as it appears to have appeared to me then." And Mr.
Justice Story, accounting for his contradiction of his own
former opinion, quite properly put the matter: "My own error,
however, can furnish no ground for its being adopted by this
Court." . . . If there are other ways of gracefully and good
naturedly surrendering former views to a better considered
position, I invoke them all.9
His courage in 1940 and his humility (and courage in admitting
error) in 1950, as well as his openness to persuasion, exemplify the
character traits of a good judge.
Justice Jackson is not alone. Justice Blackmun displayed the
same combination of courage and humility-albeit without Jackson's
humor-when, in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority,1°° he provided the fifth vote to overrule an earlier case in
which he had joined the majority. Justice Stevens was persuaded to
change his views on affirmative action, 01 and Justices Black and
Douglas rethought the constitutionality of requiring students to
salute the flag.10' Chief Justice Rehnquist, having once believed that
Miranda v. Arizona 10 3 was not a constitutionally-based decision,
later changed his mind and voted to invalidate Congress' attempt to
° Willingness to change one's mind-to be persuadedoverrule it.'O
is one hallmark of a judge who is both humble and courageous.
98. 340 U.S. 162 (1950).
99. Id. at 178 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citations and some ellipses
omitted).

100. 469 U.S. 528 (1985), overrulingNat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976).
101. Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 408 (1978)
(Stevens, J.,

concurring in part and dissenting in part), with Adarand

Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 242 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. Compare Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), with W.
Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), overruling Minersville,

310 U.S. 586.
103. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
104.

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440-41 (2000).

Justice

Rehnquist's earlier views may be found in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
444 (1974) and New York v. Quarles,467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984).
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How we identify other such judges I leave for another day,
noting only that there are no mechanical tests for good judgment.
As former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach told the Senate
Judiciary Committee deliberating on the nomination of Robert Bork
to the United States Supreme Court, "Were I in your position... the
central question I would be asking is this. Is Judge Bork a man of
judgment? Not intellect, not reasoning, not lawyering skills, not
1°
ideology, not philosophy-simply, judgment. Is he a wise person?" 0
However daunting the task may seem, in the end, describing
(and finding) individuals well-suited to the task of judging is likely
to prove more useful than seeking artificial mechanisms to constrain
poor judgment, or debating once again whether modern American
judicial review is a curse or a blessing.

105. Other scholars have described Justices Benjamin Cardozo and Louis
Brandeis in terms that resonate with my thesis. See Goldberg, supra note 28,
at 1419-24 (Cardozo); Farber, supra note 22, at 163-65, 186-90 (Brandeis);
Noonan, supra note 65, at 1130-31 (both). Mark Tushnet has suggested that we
can identify virtuous judges by the integrity of their narratives. Mark Tushnet,
The Degradationof ConstitutionalDiscourse,81 GEO. L.J. 251, 258 (1992).
106. Anthony Lewis, Abroad At Home; Question of Judgment, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 1987, at D23.
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